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Submitted June 21, 2011 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 






CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Daniel Garraud appeals his conviction for armed bank robbery on the grounds that 
the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict and that the District Court erred by 
not suppressing evidence, by permitting improper statements by a witness, and by failing 
to acquit him due to a speedy trial violation.  Garraud also appeals his sentence, 
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maintaining that the District Court considered an impermissible factor in determining his 
sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and 
sentence. 
I.   
 
 We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  On June 29, 2007, at 9:35 a.m., a perpetrator committed an armed robbery of 
the Bank of America in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, leaving with $22,343 in a green 
laundry bag with two GPS tracking devices embedded in the cash.  Witnesses described 
the robber as a black male with large, deep eyes who wore a dust mask, latex gloves, a 
green and white Philadelphia Phillies hat, a dark hooded sweatshirt, blue jeans, and white 
sneakers.  The robber was also carrying a semi-automatic handgun.  Witnesses informed 
the police that the robber had fled toward Philmont Avenue.  Police dispatch confirmed 
this direction using the GPS tracking devices and informed police officers that the robber 
was driving a motor vehicle in the direction of Route 1 and Roosevelt Boulevard.   
 Officers Richard Greger and Jerry Velez were stationed at the intersection of 
Route 1 and Roosevelt Boulevard looking at passing cars in an attempt to locate a person 
fitting the robber’s description.  The officers spotted a black male driving alone in a silver 
Acura and observed the vehicle come to a stop at a red light.  Police dispatch advised the 
officers that the GPS devices indicated that the vehicle was stationary.  Within seven 
minutes of the robbery, the officers pulled over the driver, Daniel Garraud, and observed 
in his vehicle in plain view a handgun holster, a dark plastic bag with a dust mask 
sticking out of it, and a green and white Philadelphia Phillies hat.  Officer Velez arrested 
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Garraud and secured the evidence in the black plastic bag.  When Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) agents arrived at the scene, the agents confirmed that the GPS 
tracking devices were inside Garraud’s vehicle.  Witnesses were also taken to the scene 
and identified Garraud as having the same physical characteristics and clothing as the 
robber.  After obtaining a proper search warrant, the agents discovered that Garraud’s 
black plastic bag contained surgical gloves and a dark hooded sweatshirt in addition to 
the dust mask.  Garraud’s vehicle contained a semi-automatic firearm and a green laundry 
bag with $22,343 in cash attached to the GPS tracking devices.   
 Following his arrest, Garraud maintained that while he was driving to work in 
New Jersey he spotted two bags on the side of the road and stopped to pick them up.  He 
stated that he never looked inside the bags.  His statement was unable to be substantiated 
by work records, as Garraud was not expected to be at work on that Friday.       
At Garraud’s trial, evidence was presented that a cell site analysis traced 
Garraud’s cell phone use prior to the robbery to the vicinity of the bank.  The 
Government also presented DNA evidence that DNA traces left on the dust mask and 
clothing matched Garraud’s DNA profile.  Based on the physical, scientific, and 
eyewitness testimonial evidence provided at trial, on May 1, 2009, Garraud was found 
guilty of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and using a firearm 
during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  Garraud filed post-trial 
motions seeking acquittal based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and a new trial 
based on the admission of improper evidence and improper statements by a trial witness.  
The District Court denied Garraud’s motions.   
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At sentencing, Garraud’s advisory guidelines range for the armed robbery was 
forty-six to fifty-seven months of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum consecutive 
sentence of eighty-four months’ imprisonment for the firearm conviction.  Garraud 
argued that the mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm required a jury 
finding that such a weapon was used during the crime.  He also requested that the Court 
show compassion in sentencing due to his lack of a prior criminal history.  The District 
Court concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence for the firearm conviction was 
appropriate as the surveillance video at the bank revealed him brandishing a firearm.  
Additionally, the District Court recognized Garraud’s lack of a criminal history, but 
determined that the violent nature of the crime coupled with his lack of remorse and 
acknowledgement of his actions did not justify a sentence outside of the guidelines range.  
On October 21, 2009, the District Court sentenced Garraud to fifty-four months of 
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction with a consecutive sentence of eighty-




 Garraud brings six claims on appeal.  He seeks a new trial based on the District 
Court’s failure to suppress evidence, its improper admission of statements made at trial 
by a witness, and because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  
Additionally, Garraud argues that he is entitled to acquittal based on a sufficiency-of-the-
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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evidence claim and as a result of a speedy trial violation.  Garraud also challenges his 
sentence as unreasonable.   
A. 
 We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for clear 
error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s application of the law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Police may perform an investigatory stop of a person when they have a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30 (1968).  Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause . . 
. in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable 
than that required to show probable cause.”  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 
(1990).  In determining the legality of a Terry stop, we must ensure, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, that the officers had “‘some minimal level of objective 
justification’ for making the stop.”  Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 
(1984)). 
 Garraud argues that Officers Greger and Velez did not have reasonable suspicion 
to stop his vehicle, and thus the evidence obtained as a result of this illegal Terry stop 
should have been suppressed.  The basis of Garraud’s argument is that the officers’ 
reasonable suspicion was not supported by the dispatch radio broadcasts and was based 
solely on race.  We disagree.  The record demonstrates that Officers Greger and Velez 
knew that (1) a bank robbery had occurred within minutes and miles from their position, 
(2) two GPS devices were tracking the perpetrator to their location, (3) they were looking 
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for a black male driving a vehicle into the intersection, and (4) the vehicle had become 
stationary once the only car with a black male driver had been identified at a red light.  
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers met the 
minimal level of objective justification necessary for making the stop, and therefore, we 
will affirm the District Court’s denial of Garraud’s motion to suppress and deny his 
appeal for a new trial on this ground.   
B.  
With regard to preserved challenges as to the admissibility of alleged improper 
statements, we review the District Court’s denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion.  
Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2002).  Garraud contends that 
an unsolicited, isolated remark at trial by FBI Special Agent Steven McQueen 
referencing the Bureau of Prisons was improper and prejudicial.  In responding to the 
Government on direct examination regarding how the DNA collection process works, 
McQueen responded:  “First thing that would happen, we -- once we’re over at the 
Bureau of Prisons and we make contact with the subject of the --.”  Before McQueen 
could complete his statement, Garraud objected to the reference to the Bureau of Prisons, 
arguing that such a statement inferred that he was incarcerated and, hence, considered 
dangerous.  The District Court denied Garraud’s motion for a mistrial, but at his request, 
provided the jury instructions on the statement:  “Ladies and gentlemen, you are 
cautioned to completely disregard the last comment by the witness, the last statement by 
the witness.  Do not consider it.  Erase it from your memory.”   
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 We conclude that McQueen’s statement does not provide grounds for a mistrial 
because (1) it was not specific to Garraud’s actual incarceration in that it only provided a 
reference to a detention facility generally in describing a scientific process, (2) any 
possible inference the statement created as to Garraud’s incarceration was cured by the 
Court’s limiting instruction, and (3) the statement clearly did not affect the outcome of 
the trial in light of the overwhelming, uncontradicted evidence.  See United States v. 
Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A mistrial is not required where improper 
remarks were harmless, considering their scope, their relation to the context of the trial, 
the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions and the strength of the evidence 
supporting the conviction.”).  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of a 
mistrial based on McQueen’s statement. 
C. 
 In evaluating an allegation of a violation of a defendant’s speedy trial rights, we 
review a District Court’s legal conclusions de novo, its factual conclusions subject to a 
clearly erroneous standard, and its grants of continuances for an abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988).  Garraud 
asserts that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and 
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c), because twenty-two months elapsed from the 
time of his arrest until his trial.   
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court established a balancing test to 
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determine whether an accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights have been violated.  
Courts must weigh the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”  Id. at 530.  Embodying this Sixth 
Amendment right, the Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be brought to trial 
within seventy days from his initial appearance.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c).  If the trial does 
not commence within seventy days, the Act requires the indictment to be dismissed.  18 
U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).   
   After a review of the record, we conclude that there has not been a Sixth 
Amendment violation or a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as Garraud was the cause for 
any delay in his trial.  Following his indictment on July 25, 2007, he requested an 
extension of time for discovery, which was granted by the District Court on September 
13, 2007.  Following the close of discovery in November 2007, Garraud once again 
sought to defer the trial in order to allow for plea negotiations.  Garraud did not request a 
plea hearing until April 2008.  The hearing occurred on June 6, 2008 and Garraud 
demurred from entering a plea.  The District Court set a trial date for June 23, 2008, but 
Garraud requested and was given six trial continuances, all of which were granted after 
he waived the application of the Speedy Trial Act.   
In weighing the factors set forth above, delays which are caused by the defendant 
or his attorney weigh against finding a violation.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 
(recognizing that under the Sixth Amendment “if delay is attributable to the defendant, 
then his waiver may be given effect under the standard waiver doctrine”); United States 
v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 443 (3d Cir. 1994) (warning against defendants seeking dismissal 
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of indictments based on their own attorneys’ requests for continuances under the Speedy 
Trial Act, and recognizing that defendants “cannot be wholly free to abuse the system by 
requesting (h)(8) continuances and then argue that their convictions should be vacated 
because the continuances they acquiesced in were granted”).  Since Garraud requested 
the delays he now complains of, we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding 
that there were no speedy trial violations.     
D. 
 Garraud seeks acquittal based on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, arguing that 
the evidence presented that he performed the bank robbery was purely speculation, 
conjecture, and surmise.  Since Garraud failed to move for acquittal based on a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim before the District Court, we will review for plain 
error.  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 62 (3d Cir. 2008).  “A conviction based on 
insufficient evidence is plain error only if the verdict ‘constitutes a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.’”  United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting United States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d Cir. 1991)).   
 We conclude that Garraud’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is not supported by 
the trial record.  The record provides voluminous evidence linking Garraud to the 
robbery, including eyewitness testimony, DNA analysis, and the physical evidence of the 
robbery found in his car.  Additionally, Garraud’s own account of the events regarding 
how he obtained the spoils and physical evidence of the robbery was contradicted by the 
Government’s testimony that he was not on his way to work at the time of the robbery.  
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Garraud’s conviction does not constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and we 
will therefore affirm his conviction in light of the sufficient evidence presented at trial.   
E. 
 Garraud also claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence.  We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for a 
new trial for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 
2008).  In this case, however, we need not reach the merits of Garraud’s argument as he 
has waived his claim by failing to move before the District Court for a new trial based on 
the weight of the evidence.  See United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 
2004) (recognizing that “a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion” 
and “even if a defendant moves for a new trial, a trial judge may not grant a new trial on 
a ground not raised in the motion”).  In any event, even if Garraud had moved for a new 
trial and that motion had been denied, we would have agreed with the District Court that 
the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.   
F. 
 We review sentences to ensure that they are substantively reasonable and imposed 
in a procedurally fair manner.  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008).  We must first determine whether the District Court committed “significant 
procedural error,” for example, by “failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors . 
. . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”  Id. (quoting Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  In conducting this procedural assessment, “[w]e review 
alleged factual errors for clear error but exercise plenary review over ‘purely legal’ 
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errors, such as a misinterpretation of the Guidelines or the governing case law.”  United 
States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 526 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  If the District 
Court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness 
of the sentence “under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Id.   
Garraud contends that his sentence was unreasonable because the District Court 
based his sentence on the fact that he failed to explain his criminal conduct and plead 
guilty in light of the overwhelming evidence presented.  The District Court, however, 
only considered such factors in determining whether Garraud deserved a lower sentence 
based on “compassion.”  After reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err in sentencing Garraud within the advisory guidelines range and that the 
District Court meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors.  We do not consider it 
improper that the District Court denied Garraud’s request for a lower sentence based on 
compassion after determining that the violent nature of the crime coupled with Garraud’s 
failure to accept responsibility for his actions weighed more heavily than his lack of a 
prior criminal history.  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (permitting a decrease in a defendant’s 
offense level if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his 
offense).  Hence, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
of the District Court.   
